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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that it is a sunny morning and you have just finished your
morning cup of coffee on your back porch before heading in to get ready for the
day. After showering and going through your normal morning routine, on your
way out the front door, you find a notice nailed to your door stating that your
home is within a redevelopment area, and it will be condemned and razed in the
near future.
I The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 9'h Cong. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (state-
ment of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
1
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Now, imagine how you would feel if this was your family home, which
you remodeled with your blood, sweat, and tears, or which has been in your
family for decades, and may have been built with your own hands, or those of
your family members. Imagine if it was your home that was tagged for demoli-
tion by the local Redevelopment Authority because the Authority thinks your
property could be put to better use by someone else. Maybe that someone else
is a large private corporation who will build luxury high-rise housing, a corpo-
rate headquarters, or just a bigger and better home, by using the State's power of
eminent domain 2 delegated to them by your great State's Legislature. Under
these circumstances, no homeowner would be happy. One would be even more
upset when he or she found out that, not only can this happen, but that it is Con-
stitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's latest interpretation of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3 In a nutshell, this story of finding a dream
home only to have it subsequently tagged for demolition is the sad story of the
lead plaintiff in Kelo v. City of New London,4 a case decided by the United
States Supreme Court in June of 2005.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that private
property shall not be taken by the government unless it is taken for a public use
and just compensation is paid to the private landowner. 5 This is a bedrock prin-
ciple upon which private property rights have been built, as it implicitly pre-
cludes the government from forcing citizens to surrender their private property
for anything other than a valid "public use." The problem is that when interpret-
ing the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, the United States Supreme Court
has interpreted the phrase "public use," also known as the Public Use Clause,6
so expansively that a public use can now be justified if the legislature merely
2 Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to acquire private property for public use.
BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 562 (8b' ed. 2004). Both State and Federal Governments have the
power of eminent domain and this power lies in the legislative branch, not the executive. RICHARD
R. POWELL, 13 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.01[2], [3] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew
Bender) 2005. This eminent domain power can be delegated from the legislature to any political
subdivision or other entity. Id. at [3][a]. There are no restraints on a legislature's ability to dele-
gate its eminent domain authority. Id. at [3][b].
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Stated in full the Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment of indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
4 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 The Public Use Clause refers to the "public use" requirement within the Fifth Amendment.
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provides evidence of appreciable benefits to the community, including new jobs
7and increased tax revenue.
Various pre-Kelo interpretations of the Public Use Clause by the United
States Supreme Court and a variety of state supreme courts have forced scores
of Americans to surrender their private property to entities wielding the gov-
ernment's awesome power of eminent domain.8 For example, the power of
eminent domain has been used to raze a minority neighborhood in order to pro-
vide access and parking for a local casino and hotel,9 to destroy a successful
business to make way for an alleged bigger, better one, and to demolish a
neighborhood of colonial homes to make way for upscale condominiums and
high-end retail." These examples are just the tip of the iceberg regarding the
actions that state and local governments have engaged in under the guise of fur-
thering "public use."'
12
This Note will focus on the ever expanding interpretation of the Public
Use Clause, from the meaning of the Clause as originally envisioned by the
Framers of the Constitution to its current expansive and seemingly pro-
condemnation meaning.' 3 It is this vast change in the interpretation of the term
"public use" that has led to many post-Kelo abuses of the state's eminent do-
7 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor J., dissenting).
8 DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT
EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN 1-2 (2003),
http'/www.castlecoalition.org/report/pdf/ED-report.pdf. Between 1998 and 2002, the study
documented over 10,000 eminent domain actions that were threatened or actually filed against
private property owners. Id.
9 Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998).
This case was not only illustrative of the egregious uses of eminent domain, but it also illustrated
one of the rare cases in which the property-owner won her case in court. See Paul Schwartzman,
She Kicks Sand in Trump's Face, Sneers at the Donald's Bucks, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 26, 1998,
at News 7.
10 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal.
2001).
"1 BERLINER, supra note 8, at 165-66.
12 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor J., dissenting); Casino, 727 A.2d at 102.
13 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opin-
ion stated that:
[T]he Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use. It holds
that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private
use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is
predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public - such as in-
creased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure. But nearly any
lawful use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental
benefit to the public. Thus, if predicated (or even guaranteed) positive side ef-
fects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another constitu-
tional, then the words for "public use" do not realistically exclude any takings,
and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
2007]
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main power and, it is this change in "Public Use Clause" interpretation that will
certainly lead to similar abuses in the future.'
4
Part II of this Note will trace the evolution of the Public Use Clause
from its original meaning, to an interim narrow interpretation, and then finally
to its evolving "public purpose" interpretation. Part III will explore two land-
mark eminent domain cases styled Berman v. Parker15 and Hawaii Housing
Authority. v. Midkiff.16 More specifically, it will look at the broad definition that
the phrase "public use" received in those cases. Part IV will explore County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, 17 a Michigan Supreme Court case that illustrates a tempo-
rary pullback from a broad interpretation of public use to a more traditional nar-
row approach. Part V discusses the recent Kelo decision, focusing on the ex-
pansive interpretation that the Public Use Clause received in that opinion. Part
VI will illustrate why, after the Kelo case, the floodgates for eminent domain
abuse are now open due to an expansion of the term "public use" to include
economic development and other seemingly endless justifications. Finally, part
VII will include closing remarks and conclusions.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PHRASE "PUBLIC USE"
A. The Framer's Original Meaning
The United States Constitution did not create the power of eminent do-
main.18 It was assumed when the Constitution was signed that the power al-
ready existed as an aspect of state sovereignty.19 But, the Constitution did at-
tempt to limit the use of the state's eminent domain power. 20 These limitations
14 One commentator has stated that the "public use provision has become toothless in the text
of the modem doctrine...." Camarin Madigan, Taking for Any Purpose?, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 179, 192 (2003) (internal quotations omitted). This argument advances the
thought that the Public Use Clause has practically been interpreted out of the Constitution. Id.
15 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
16 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
17 684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
18 POWELL, supra note 2, at § 79F.01 [Il[a][3] (noting that the "power [of eminent domain] was
so well accepted that prior to the adoption of the Constitution, none of the state constitutions ex-
plicitly granted to the state governments the power of eminent domain, even though the state
governments in every state exercised that power.") (citations omitted).
19 The inherent power of eminent domain was "well known when the Constitution was
adopted." Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875). The actual phrase "eminent domain"
has been traced back to the legal writings of Grotius in 1685. See Jack J. Kitchin, What Use is a
Public Use in Eminent Domain?, 4 ST. Louis U. L.J. 316 n. 1 (1957) (citing Graff v. Bird-in-Hand
Turnpike Co., 18 A. 431 (Pa. 1889)).
20 See Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) ("The power of eminent
domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every independent [S]tate."); see Kohl, 91
U.S. at 372 ("The right of eminent domain was... known when the Constitution was adopted..
."). See also Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d at 781 ("[Wlhen [the Michigan] Constitution was ratified in
[Vol. 109
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can be found in the text of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, which de-
clares that private property cannot be taken for a public use unless just compen-
sation is paid to the landowner from whom the property is taken.2'
The Takings Clause, which originally only applied to the federal gov-
ernment,22 became applicable to the States through the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment.23 Further, all States have constitutional provisions limiting the
exercise of eminent domain to situations where there is a valid public use and
just compensation is paid to the landowner. 24
Framer James Madison proposed what would come to be known as the
Takings Clause to the House of Representatives in 178925 in response to the
concerns that many of the founders expressed over the protection of private
property and private property rights. 26 Interpreting the "public use" phrase in
the Takings Clause proposed by Madison has caused the judiciary problems
1963, it was well-established... that the constitutional 'public use' doctrine was not an absolute
bar against the transfer of condemned property to private entities.") (citations omitted).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of the just compensation element of the Fifth
Amendment, see POWELL, supra note 2, at § 79F.01 [I ][c].
22 Baron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (opining that the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment contains "no expression indicating an intention to apply ... to state gov-
ernments").
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 239 (1897). This case noted that:
The conclusion of the court on this question is that, since the adoption of the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment compensation for private property taken for public
uses constitutes as essential element in "due process of law," and that without
such compensation the appropriation of private property to public uses, no
matter under what form of procedure it is taken, would violate the provisions
of the [F]ederal [C]onstitution.
Id.
24 POWELL, supra note 2, at § 79F.01 [a][iii] (citing I NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 1, §
1.3 (Matthew Bender ed. 1990). Every state except North Carolina has a Constitutional provision
that roughly mirrors the takings language of the Fifth Amendment. Id. See MICH. CONST. art. 15,
§ 9. North Carolina has decisions that are in conformance with the language of the Fifth Amend-
ment. POWELL, supra note 2, § 79F.01[a][iiil.
25 5 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1012, 1026-27 (1980). Madi-
son's proposal stated "no person shall be... obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be
necessary for public use, without a just compensation." Id. at 1027. See also Powell, supra note 2,
at § 79F.01 [a][iii] (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433-36 (1789)) (Madison's proposal was made on
June 8, 1789 as one of twelve proposals he sought to pass).
26 See THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carey and McClellan eds.,
2001); See also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (Carey and McClellan eds.,
2001); "Discourse on Davila," THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, (1851) at vol. 6, 280 (Charles Francis
Adams, ed.) (Little, Brown, 1851) (noting that, "Property must be secured or liberty cannot ex-
ist."); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1782, vol 1, 302 (Max Farrand, ed.) (Yale
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1937) (Alexander Hamilton stated that, "One great objective of Government
is personal protection and the security of Property.").
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from the beginning. 27 Historically, the problem of corralling a clear definition
of the phrase had been exacerbated by a lack of litigation that could have been
used to flesh out a clear meaning.28 This lack of litigation lasted for roughly
forty years after the ratification of the Constitution. There were two main rea-
sons for this lull in eminent domain litigation. First, at that time, the govern-
ment could build public highways, a task that often requires the use of eminent
domain, without exercising this power because large amounts of publicly held
land upon which roads could be readily constructed, was still available .29 Sec-
ond, when the government did find itself in a situation that necessitated the use
of eminent domain, it either used that power for a clear public use, such as con-
struction of roads and public highways, or it was used in situations where there
was such strong colonial precedent that no challenges were evoked, such as
building mill dams or drainage systems.30
Over the next 150 years numerous cases were litigated in which the
Public Use Clause was interpreted. 31 This litigation, however, only muddied the
waters of public use and eventually led the Supreme Court to its present seem-
ingly all-inclusive interpretation. 2
During the nineteenth century, courts predominately interpreted the
scope of eminent domain power and, more precisely, the phrase "public use"
narrowly. 3 This narrow view reflected the jurisprudential belief of the times
that the Public Use Clause was a straightforward and plain concept that permit-
ted a taking of private property only when that land would literally be used by
27 POWELL, supra note 2, at § 79F.03[l] (laying out the many conflicting historical precedents
regarding the phrase "public use."). There are no records of Madison's thoughts about this pro-
posal, but commentators have suggested that Madison was influenced by a lack of property rights
respect exhibited by the British in colonial times among other reasons. See William Michael Tre-
anor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 782 (1995); see also William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance
of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985).
28 See POWELL, supra note 2, at §79F.03(1) (explaining that there was nearly a forty year pe-
riod when the government used the power of eminent domain only to construct dams and build
roads). Despite the seemingly universal acceptance of the validity of eminent domain power, it
was not until 1875 that the Supreme Court had the opportunity to declare that the federal govern-
ment actually had this power. See Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371-72.
29 POWELL, supra note 2, at § 79.03[l]; see Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent
Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1949).
30 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 7, § 7.01 (Matthew Bender ed. 1990).
31 POWELL, supra note 2, at § 79.03[3].
32 POWELL, supra note 2, at § 70.03[3][b].
33 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662 (2005) (opining that "[While many
state courts in the mid-19 th century endorsed 'use by the public' as the proper definition of public
use, that narrow view steadily eroded over time."); see also POWELL, supra note 2, at §
79F.03[3][a] (noting that at this same time there were some courts who used a broader view that
public use included any use that "manifestly contributes to the general welfare and prosperity of
the whole community .... 9).
[Vol. 109
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the public. 34 This narrow view basically required that portions of the public
have physical access to the property 35 or, as some scholars have noted, "a public
use exists when the public uses something., 36 Essentially, in order for a use to
be declared public under this narrow view, "the property acquired by eminent
domain [had to] actually be used by the public or ... the public [had to] have
the opportunity to use the land.",
37
This notion that the public had to have a right of access to the land, led
the Supreme Court, in its first major eminent domain opinion, 38 to opine that
each state had "the right and duty of guarding its own existence, and of protect-
ing and promoting the interests and welfare of the community at large" through
the power to take private property.39 In West River Bridge Company v. Dix,4°
the Court was asked to decide the constitutionality of the use of eminent domain
in relation to property that had been acquired by a private entity through a state
contract. 4'
This case was litigated over the issue of whether Vermont's exercise of
its eminent domain power against a bridge company, who had a contract with
34 Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 67-68 (1986)
(exploring the various judicial tests for interpreting the meaning of "public"); see also Harry N.
Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REv. 217,
224-25 (1984) (relating the public trust doctrine to public use. "The public trust doctrine provided
that certain resources were held by the government 'as a trust for the public use and benefit' - so
that courts properly could place limits on government's discretionary power in regulating or alien-
ating such resources.").
35 Scheiber, supra note 34, at 224-225. Cases from numerous jurisdictions enunciated this
standard. See Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist., 68 N.E. 522 (1I1. 1903); In re Opinion of the Justices, 98
N.E. 611 (Mass. 1912); Ryerson v. Brown, 24 Am. Rep. 564 (Mich. 1877); In re Deansville
Cemetery Ass'n, 23 Am. Rep. 86 (N.Y. 1876); Witham v. Osbum 18 Am. Rep. 287 (Or. 1873).
36 See Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the So-Called
"Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1255 (2002) (citing Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson
R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 56-62 (N.Y. 1837) (The federal district court in this case interpreted the
phrase "public use" as "a constitutional declaration, that private property, without the consent of
the owner, shall be taken only for the public use .... [the] direct possession, occupation and en-
joyment by the public.") (internal quotations omitted); see also Nathan Alexander Sales, Note,
Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's "Public Use" Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J.
339, 345 (1999) (citing Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance
Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 603 (1949)). See also Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403
(1896).
37 NICHOLS, supra note 30, at ch. 7. § 7.02(1].
38 See BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 66-68 (1938) (noting
that the power of eminent domain was not directly before the Supreme Court until 1848 in West
River Bridge Co. v. Dix).
39 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 531 (1848).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 530.
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the State to build and maintain a bridge, was constitutional. 42 The taking in-
volved a taking by the State of a privately constructed bridge in order for that
bridge to be put to a public use.43 The majority held that in making the private
contract for the construction of the bridge, the State had not contracted away its
eminent domain power, and therefore, the bridge could be validly taken under
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, if the state determined such exercise of
its eminent domain power was necessary. 44
In concurrence, Justice Levi Woodbury offered his interpretation of
"public use," stating that any other interpretation would be "too broad, too open
to abuse. 4 5 Illustrating what he thought were permissible public uses, Justice
Woodbury stated that:
the user [sic] must be for the people at large, -- for travelers, --
for all, -- must also be compulsory by them, and not optional
with the owners, -- must be right by the people, not a favor, --
must be under public regulations as to tolls, or owned, or sub-
ject to be owned, by the State, in order to make the corporation
and object public ... It is not enough that there is an act or in-
corporation for a bridge, or turnpike, or railroad, to make them
public, so as to be able to take private property constitutionally,
without the owner's consent; but their uses, and objects, and in-
terests ... must in their essence, and character and liabilities, be
public within the meaning of the term "public use.' 46
Justice Woodbury went on to state that the road was "a free road for the people
of the State to use," and therefore it was "eminently for a public use., 47 This is
the essence of the narrow view; the land that was taken was expected to be put
to use for the people of the community. 48 The narrow view, while once the view
widely accepted by many State courts in evaluating "public use" claims, has
since been eroded away in route to the current more expansive definition.
49
In dismissing an application of the narrow view, the Kelo Court stated
that "this Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned prop-
42 Id. This case defined how the Contracts Clause would mesh with the power of eminent
domain. The Court held that a compensated taking of property by a State, in conformance with its
own duly made laws, did not violate the Contracts Clause. Id. at 536.
43 Id. at 531.
44 Id. at 535-36.
45 Id. at 545 (Woodbury, J. concurring).
46 Id. at 546-47 (internal citations omitted).
47 Id. at 547.
48 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
49 See cases cited supra note 12. See also POWELL, supra note 2, at § 70.0313][b].
[Vol. 109
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erty be put into use for the general public., 50 Explaining the United States Su-
preme Court's departure from this test, the Kelo Court avowed that "[n]ot only
was the 'use by the public' test difficult to administer . . . but it proved to be
impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society."'', Due to
this perceived difficulty, it was clear that change was on the way. That change
came by way of the public purpose test.52
B. The Public Purpose Test
When the United States Supreme Court began applying the Fifth
Amendment to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in the late 19th century,
a broader and more natural interpretation of public use as a "public purpose"
was promulgated.53 The public purpose test essentially equates "public use"
with public interest, focusing on the benefit the public would get from the tak-
ing.M4 Contrast this view, to the previous narrow view, where the taking must
create a facility to which the public has physical access and the underpinnings of
the expansion of public use are evident.
In an early case applying the public purpose test, Mt. Vernon-
Woodberry Cotton Duck Company v. Alabama Interstate Power Company,56 the
United States Supreme Court expanded the permissible scope of public uses to
include not only actual governmental uses, but also private uses where the clear
beneficiary of the condemnation is the public at large.
In Cotton Duck, a power company licensed by the state and empowered
with the State's eminent domain power sought to condemn Cotton Duck's pri-
vate land for the construction of a new power plant.57 This power plant, the
Cotton Duck Court noted, was going to "manufacture, supply and sell to the
public, power produced by water. 5 8 Cotton Duck Company challenged the
condemnation proceedings due to, among other things, the lack of a public use
50 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662 (2005) (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)).
51 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (internal quotations omitted).
52 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2663 (opining that "[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined that
concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field").
53 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64 (1896).
54 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 531 (1848).
55 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
56 240 U.S. 30 (1916) [hereinafter Cotton Duck].
57 Id. at 31-32 (noting that the power company had properly gained the power of eminent
domain from the state of Alabama). It is important to note that in Cotton Duck, the United States
Supreme Court opined that it would extend great deference to state decisions regarding what is a
public use in light of the fact that state courts were in a better position to know what constituted a
public use within their jurisdiction. Id. at 32 (citing Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1905)).
58 Id. at 32.
20071
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of the property after condemnation.59 Rejecting Cotton Duck Company's argu-
ment and holding that the condemnation could go forward, Justice Holmes ma-
jority opinion stated:
In the organic relations of modern society it may sometimes be
hard to draw the line that is supposed to limit the authority of
the legislature to exercise or delegate the power of eminent do-
main. But to gather the streams from waste and to draw from
them energy, labor without brains, and so to save mankind from
toil that can be spared, is to supply what, next to intellect, is the
very foundation of all our achievements and all our welfare. If
that purpose is not public we should be at a loss to say what is.
The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test
is established. 6°
The public purpose test, described by Justice Holmes and utilized in Cotton
Duck, represented a retreat from the narrow view. But, in this case, the expan-
sion was necessary because if the Cotton Duck Court would have adhered to a
strict narrow interpretation, construction of power plants, railroads, and other
public utilities would have historically been much tougher under the Takings
Clause.
I. BERMAN AND MIDKIFF- FURTHER EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF THE
PUBLIC USE CLAUSE
The interpretation of public use as public purpose endured as the
method of determining proper and improper takings into the mid 1900,S.6 1 But
looming on the horizon was the Supreme Court's opinion in Berman v. Parker,
It was in this case that the seeds of a dangerously expansive interpretation were
planted.62 Speaking on the dangers of an expansive interpretation of the Consti-
tution, Supreme Court Justice William Patterson, in 1795, warned:
The Constitution is the origin and measure of legislative author-
ity. It says to legislators, thus far ye shall go and no further. Not
a particle of it should be shaken; not a pebble of it should be
removed. Innovation is dangerous. One encroachment leads to
another; precedent gives birth to precedent; what has been done
59 Id.
60 Id. (emphasis added).
61 Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) (stating that, "This Court has
many times warned that one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another person
without ajustifying public purpose . .
62 Berman, 348 U.S. at 26.
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may be done again; thus radical principles are generally broken
in upon, and the Constitution is eventually destroyed.63
Over 200 years after the rendering of this opinion, this language would be vali-
dated. The Kelo opinion was born from broad precedent that was formed as
each new public use decision expanded the previous interpretation even the
slightest of margins. 64
This prior section briefly overviewed the various interpretations of
"public use" prior to the Berman v. Parker decision. From the narrow, strict
constructionist view, to the minimally broader public purpose test, the meaning
of the phrase "public use" experienced little evolution in the approximately 150
years preceding Berman.
The Berman decision was the beginning of the innovation and expan-
sion phase of the Public Use Clause, just the type of expansive Constitutional
interpretation that Justice Patterson warned would lead to encroachments and
the eventual demise of the Constitution.65 The Berman decision laid the ground-
work and foundation for the Midkiff and Kelo Courts to expand the term even
further.
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in Berman v. Parker and
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, two seminal cases in the development of
eminent domain law in the United States, are illustrative of the Court's new, less
restrictive approach to the use of eminent domain power. These decisions intro-
duced a broader interpretation of "public use" by giving a great amount of def-
erence to legislative definitions regarding what constituted a valid public use.66
This approach afforded States and municipalities the opportunity to engage in a
wide range of condemnations that certainly would have been deemed improper
prior to Berman.67 Given the deference that the United States Supreme Court
exercises when reviewing state court decisions concerning local conditions that
might necessitate the use of eminent domain and the rejection of the narrow
view in favor of broader tests, "it is not surprising that the Court for more than a
hundred years has not failed to find a 'public use' in a state takings case.,
68
63 VanHorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1795).
64 From West River to Cotton Duck to Berman to Midkiff, it seems clear that the interpretation
of what would constitute an acceptable public use has evolved, based in part on language from the
prior decisions.
65 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
66 See generally Berman, 348 U.S. 26; Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
67 Benjamin D. Cramer, Note, Eminent Domain for Private Development - An Irrational Basis
for the Erosion of Property Rights, 55 CASE W. REs. 409, 415-19 (2004).
68 POWELL, supra note 2, at § 79F.03[3][b][ii].
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A. Berman v. Parker
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court in Bennan held constitutional
Washington D.C.'s redevelopment plan that utilized eminent domain to rejuve-
nate an area of the city that had deteriorated to such a point that it was deemed a
slum. 69 In Section 2 of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act,70 Con-
gress stated:
a legislative determination that owing to technological and so-
ciological changes, obsolete lay-out, and other factors, condi-
tions existing in the District of Columbia with respect to sub-
standard housing and blighted areas, including the use of build-
ings in alleys as dwellings for human inhabitation, are injurious
to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare; and it is hereby
declared to be the policy of the United States to protect and
promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the seat of the Gov-
ernment by eliminating all such injurious conditions by employ-
ing all means necessary and appropriate for the purpose.71
Congress further determined that "the acquisition and the assembly of
real property and the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment pursuant to a
project area redevelopment plan . . . is hereby declared to be a public use., 72
After receiving notice that his property was within the area designated for rede-
velopment, a department store owner challenged the constitutionality of the
pending taking.7 The storeowner argued that the taking was unconstitutional
because the property "is commercial, not residential property; it is not slum
housing; it will be put into the project under the management of private, not a
public, agency and redeveloped for private, not public use."74 The owner felt
that his property was not within the scope of the statute that authorized the tak-
ing and condemnation because his property was to be transferred to another
private party and this would violate the "public use" requirement.75
69 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
70 District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 592, 60 Stat. 790 (1946)
[hereinafter D.C. Act]. The Act created an agency that had the power to take full title to reality in
all cases in which it considered such acquisition necessary to carry out a project. Berman, 348
U.S. at 36.
71 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28. The Act does not define either "slums" or "blighted areas," but § 3
(r), however, defines substandard housing conditions and § 2 declares that acquisition of property
is necessary to eliminate there housing conditions. Id
72 Id. at 29 (quoting the D.C. Act, § 2, 60 Stat. at 791).
73 Id. at31.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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Instead of evaluating the department store owner's public use claim, the
Court upheld Congress's legislative determinations as an appropriate exercise of
its police power.76 In rejecting the landowners contention and upholding the
taking, the Court stated that "public use" determinations by the legislature re-
ceive great deference. 77 Further the Court opined:
In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation..
. This principle admits of no exception merely because the
power of eminent domain is involved. The role of the judiciary
in determining whether that power is being exercised for a pub-
78lic purpose is a very narrow one.
Although not expressly adopting the broad view, adoption of this view
is implicit from the text of the opinion:
We do not sit here to determine whether a particular housing
project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare
is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the
Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations
that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to
reprise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia de-
cide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in
the way.79
76 Id. at 31-32 ("We deal, in other words, with what has traditionally been known as the police
power."). The Court further acknowledged the difficulty in setting parameters for what is and
what is not a valid exercise of the police power by commenting that "[ain attempt to define its
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts." Id. at 32. In
laying out examples of what the Court thought were traditional police powers -therefore valid for
legislatures to control - the Court noted, "public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet,
law and order - these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of
the police power..I.." Id.
77 Id. at 32. The Court stated that "[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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By taking a backseat to the legislature in determining what is and what is not a
public use, the judiciary fundamentally sanctioned the broadening of the phrase
"public use," as can be seen in post-Berman eminent domain cases.80
Further limiting its role in the development of eminent domain law, the
Berman Court justified its decision to allow the taking and condemnation to go
forward by stating that it would be more suitable if the condemning entity had
the power to take every property within the designated redevelopment area,
rather than discerning between non-slum and slum properties.8 ' Extending the
legislature's essentially unfettered eminent domain discretion, the Court stated:
It is not for the Courts to oversee the choice of the boundary
line, nor sit in review on the size of a particular project area.
Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the
amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the
need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests
in the discretion of the legislative branch. 82
Therefore, under Berman both the following situations are constitution-
ally valid: (1) a taking that may not improve public health, morality, or safety,83
and is therefore not a valid exercise of eminent domain would still be constitu-
tional under the police-power justification, and (2) a taking that is not desig-
80 Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses
of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 4 (2003). One scholar commented that:
[t]he duty of the courts is to hold the legislature within its enumerated author-
ity. Once a legislature has determined that the public good is compromised,
the court presumes that the plan, created to restore the public welfare, is ra-
tionally related to a public use. If the legislature exceeds its authority and
falsely determines public use, no such judicial deference is required.
Madigan, supra note 14, at 190 (citing Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir.
1996)).
81 Berman, 348 U.S. at 35 noting that
[w]e have said enough to indicate that that it is the need of the area as a whole
which Congress and its agencies are evaluating. If owner after owner were
permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his par-
ticular property was not being used against the public interest, integrated plans
for redevelopment would suffer greatly .... [A]s we have already stated,
community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be
on a piecemeal basis - lot by lot, building by building.
Id.
82 Id. at 35-36 (citing Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893); United States ex
rel. TVA. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 547, 554 (1946); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 247
(1946)).
83 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
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nated for public use although a "public purpose" for the project as a whole has
been delineated. 84
The Berman decision set the wheels in motion for the broadening of the
"public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment by showing almost complete
deference to the decisions of legislatures, redevelopment agencies, and locali-
ties, and, thus, giving them unfettered discretion in the use of the eminent do-
main power.85 This wholesale deference opened the door for States and munici-
palities to engage in a wide range of condemnations that certainly would have
been deemed improper before Berman.86 The problem of providing a precise
yet workable definition of public use has led more cautious courts to extend
greater deference to the legislature.87 This is where Midkiff comes in.8
B. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
In Midkiff, the United States Supreme Court echoed the deferential ap-
proach laid out in Berman and reiterated that it would be applied to interpreta-
tions of the Public Use Clause.89 At issue in Midkiff was the constitutionality of
a Hawaiian law known as The Land Reform Act.9° The Hawaiian legislature
had "concluded that concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing
the State's residential fee simple market [as well as] inflating land prices." 9' In
84 Berman, 348 U.S. at 36 (opining that "[t]he rights of these property owners are satisfied
when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the
taking.").
85 See supra notes 66-67, 76 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 52.
88 See Merrill, supra note 34, at 63 (noting that "Midkiff hints that the public use analysis
parallels the 'minimum rationality' standard applied to equal protection and substantive due proc-
ess challenges to economic legislation.").
89 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (After a lengthy discussion of the deferential approach laid out in
Berman, the Court opined "On this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the Hawaii Act is
constitutional."); see also Michael J. Coughlin, Comment, Absolute Deference Leads to Unconsti-
tutional Governance: The Need For a New Public Use Rule, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1001, 1016
(2005).
90 HAw. REV. STAT. §516 (1967).
91 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232. Forty-seven percent of the privately owned land in Hawaii at the
time was owned by seventy-two people. Id. The legislature also found that eighteen land owners,
with tracts of 21,000 acres or more, owned more than forty percent of this land, and on Oahu,
twenty-two landowners held more than seventy-two percent of the fee simple title. Id. But see,
Madigan, supra note 14, at n.57. The author commented that:
In fact no oligopoly existed. The condemned land was part of a moral trust
formed by the last Hawaiian royalty. Income from the supported Kama-
hamaha schools. The long-term leaseholds were functioning for the public
good. Politician John Connor pushed the Act through the Hawaiian legislature
for his own benefit. The results were devastating to the lessees. When the land
became freehold, Japanese businessman, who do not tend to deal with lease-
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response to this perceived problem, the legislature promulgated the Land Re-
form Act,92 which sought to compel large landowners to break up their estates
and redistribute them to the current lessees through a process of condemnation.
93
This legislation also created the Hawaii Housing Authority, which had the statu-
tory authority to condemn a lessor's property and transfer it to the lessee.94 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Act was unconstitutional on the
basis that it was a "naked attempt on the part of the State of Hawaii to take the
private property of A and transfer it for B's private use and benefit."
95
In reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, the United States SuFreme
Court relied heavily on the deferential treatment analysis from Berman.9 Con-
densing the Berman analysis, the Court stated, "The public use requirement is..
. coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers. '  The Court
noted that "[tihere is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a legisla-
ture's judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when eminent domain
power is equated with the police power,' 98 but restricted the role as "an ex-
tremely narrow one.'99
Bolstering its position that the deferential approach was the proper
method for evaluating legislative schemes that involve eminent domain, the
Midkiff Court stated that "where the exercise of the eminent domain power is
holds, bought all the houses, reducing the already limited supply. The Kahala
refugees entered a seller's market that was marked by inflated prices. Al-
though the Court held that there was adequate police power to support a pub-
lic use, the reality is that the public was heavily burdened by the ruling.
Id.
92 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. The court noted that the Act:
created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for transferring
ownership of the condemned fees simple to existing lessees. By condemning
the land in question, the Hawaii Legislature intended to make the land sales
involuntary, thereby making the federal tax consequences less severe while
still facilitating the redistribution of fees simple.
Id.
93 HAW. REv. STAT. § 516-186. This Act was passed because landowners strongly rebuffed
attempts by the state to require landowners to sell the lands that they were leasing to the leasors,
due to the significant tax liabilities involved. kd To accommodate the needs of both parties, the
Act was created. Id. The act "created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for
transferring ownership of the condemned fee simple to existing lessees. By condemning the land
in question, the Hawaii Legislature intended to make the land sales involuntary, thereby making
the federal tax consequences less severe while still facilitating the redistribution of fees simple."
Id.
94 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233-34.
95 Id. at 235.
96 Id. at 239-45.
97 Id. at 240.
98 Id.
99 Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
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rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause."' ° This verbi-
age used by the court helped to further expand the interpretation of the Public
Use Clause.
Rationally related to a conceivable public purpose? This Author finds it
hard to think of any claimed public use that is not "rationally related to a con-
ceivable public purpose." This standard validates not only a public use that
relates to a public purpose, but also public uses that rationally relate to some
conceivable purpose.
This standard that was set forth in Midkiff has been called "the most lib-
eral test"'' because "any rational suggestion of general welfare will do."' 0 2 One
scholar suggests that "in its search for a 'rational basis,' courts can supply a
purpose the legislature itself missed."'0 3 Therefore, if the legislature is unable to
justify the taking, or the reason offered by the condemning entity does not do so,
a court can attempt to create a justification. 104
In solidifying the applicability of the deferential approach to all takings
cases, the Midkiff Court stated that "if a legislature, state or federal, determines
there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the takings power, courts must
defer to its determination that the taking will serve a public use."' 05
Under Berman and Midkiff, it is unclear if any condemnation proceed-
ing would violate the Public Use Clause.106 Clearly, Midkiff extended even fur-
ther the already expansive interpretation of the Public Use Clause from Ber-
man.l°7 To the chagrin of private property owners everywhere, the expansion
would later continue when the Court decided Kelo v. City of New London. But
before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, there was a tempo-
rary return to the "narrow view" in a Michigan Supreme Court case.
IV. COUNTY OF WAYNE V. HATHCOCK: A TEMPORARY RETURN TO THE
NARROW VIEW
In July of 2004, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a decision temporarily
applauded by private property owners, held that the government could not use
1o Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
101 Madigan, supra note 14, at 185.
102 Id.
103 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
181 (1985).
104 Cramer, supra note 67, at 421.
105 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
106 EPSTEIN, supra note 103, at 179.
17 See Stephen J. Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scru-
tiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REv.
285, 294-95 (2000) (illustrating how Berman affected eminent domain law).
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eminent domain to take land for the purpose of developing a privately owned
and operated business and technology park.108
After expansion of the local airport, Wayne County, Michigan at-
tempted to purchase almost 500 acres of private property around the airport to
implement a federally funded noise abatement program.1 9 To put all lands pur-
chased with federal grant money to an economically productive use, as the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration requires, the county devised the "Pinnacle Pro-
ject," which was to be a "state-of-the-art business and technology park."110 At
the completion of the voluntary sale period, forty-six randomly distributed prop-
erties were yet to be acquired."' The County authorized eminent domain to be
used for the acquisition of those properties, after which, some property owners
consented to a compensated sale. But nineteen property owners refused the
buy-out offered and challenged the condemnation. 112 The trial court rejected the
property owners' challenge and held that the taking was necessary and author-
ized under the state's public use requirement.1 3 The appeals court affirmed this
decision, though a two judge concurrence noted that the case relied on for
precedent' 14 was "poorly reasoned, wrongly decided, and ripe for reversal."
11 5
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and held in fa-
vor of the landowners. 16 The Court side-stepped the trend of utilizing the ra-
tional basis review established in Berman and Midkiff and instead utilized a
more traditional approach, within which there are only three categories of per-
missible takings.1  The first category encompasses "those enterprises generat-
108 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 765, 784 (Mich. 2004).
109 Id. at 770.
110 Id.
il Id. at 771.
112 Id. After the 46 homes were appraised as required by the Uniform Condemnation Proce-
dures, the county issued written offers, and 27 home owners took the deal. Id.
113 Id.
114 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). After
years of deferring to the traditional "narrow view," the Michigan Supreme Court deviated from
that trend and allowed the condemnation of an entire Detroit neighborhood in order to allow Gen-
eral Motors to build a plant. Id. This is generally understood to be the leading case to hold that a
taking for economic development to benefit private parties is permissible, as long as it survives a
heightened scrutiny. See Mary Massarow Ross, Public Use: Does County of Wayne v. Hathcock
Signal a Revival of the Public Use Limit to the Taking of Private Property?, 37 URB. LAw. 243,
249 (2005); see also JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 688 (1998).
115 Hathcock 684 N.W.2d at 772; see also County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2003 WL 1950233,
at 7-9 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (Murray & Fitzgerald, JJ., concurring) (commenting that the Pole-
town opinion was a departure from traditional "public use" and that the "economic crisis" that
justified that decision was not present in the case at hand), overruled by County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
116 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784.
117 Id. at 781.
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ing public benefits whose very existence depends on the use of land that can be
assembled only by the coordination central government alone is capable of
achieving.""18 The second category allows condemnation to be used if the land
will be transferred to an entity that "remains accountable to the public in its use
of that property."'1 9 Thirdly, if the condemnation is "on the basis of 'facts of
independent public significance,"' the land can be transferred to a private party
because the public use requirement would be satisfied by the "act of condemna-
tion itself, rather than the use to which the condemned land eventually would be
put.' 20 Significantly, this court did not use the rational basis test and it evalu-
ated the merits of the condemnation, as opposed to deferring to legislative or
municipal findings regarding the public purpose of the project.' 2' The county
attempted to rely on the creation of new jobs and greater tax revenue as the pro-
jected "public use" that would justify eminent domain. 122 The Michigan Su-
preme Court however, poignantly noted that "every productive unit of society..
. contributes in some way to the commonwealth. " Further, the court cau-
tioned that "if one's ownership of private property is forever subject to the gov-
ernment's determination that another private party would put one's land to bet-
ter use, then the ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by the ex-
pansion plans of any large discount retailer, 'megastore,' or the like."'
124
Justice Weaver, who concurred in part and dissented in part, agreed
with the holding of the case, but lobbied for an even narrower interpretation of
public use. She argued for a return to the "narrow view" of old,' 25 that takings
118 Id. The court offered as examples railroads, highways, and other such "instrumentalities of
commerce." Id. at 781-82.
119 Id. at 782.
120 Id. at 783.
121 Id. at 785; see also Recent Cases, Eminent Domain - Nongovernmental Takings - Michigan
Supreme Court Holds that Government Cannot Take Land to Develop a Private Office Park -
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REv. 1769 (2005).
122 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
123 Id. at 786; See also Brief of Amici Curiae of the Rutherford Institute at 9, Kelo v. City of
New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
124 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786. For similar arguments see S.W. 111. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City
Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (I1. 2002) (noting that "if [private] property ownership is to
remain what our forefathers intended it to be, if it is to remain a part of the liberty we cherish, the
economic by-products of a private capitalist's ability to develop land cannot justify a surrender of
ownership to eminent domain."); see also City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 6
(Ky. 1979) (stating that "[i]f public use was construed to mean that the public would be benefited
in the sense that the enterprise or improvement for the use of which property was taken might
contribute to the comfort or convenience of the pubic, or a portion thereof, or be esteemed neces-
sary for their enjoyment, there would be absolutely no limit on the right to take private property.
It would not be difficult for any person to show that a factory or hotel or other like improvement
he contemplated erecting or establishing would result in benefit to the public, and under this rule
the property of the citizen would never be safe from invasion" (quoting Chesapeake Stone Co. v.
Moreland, 104 S.W. 762, 765 (Ky. 1907))).
125 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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should be limited to cases in which "the public retained the right to actually use
the land,"126 and since the Pinnacle Project would be "under no obligation to let
the pubic in their doors or even on their lands," 127 this taking, in her view, did
not satisfy the Public Use Clause.
As Hathcock was the most recent major eminent domain court decision
prior to Kelo, it is no wonder the Kelo plaintiffs were optimistic about their
chances of prevailing and keeping their homes. 128 The strong verbiage used in
this opinion left no question as to the stance of the Michigan Supreme Court
when interpreting the Public Use Clause,129 a stance that would be exposed as
clearly opposite to that of the United States Supreme Court.
30
V. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
In a highly publicized five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme
Court in Kelo v. City of New London held that a city could exercise its eminent
domain power under the guise of economic development 31 and that such use
satisfies the Fifth Amendment's "public use" requirement as long as the plan
serves a public purpose.132 Generating massive public outcry and opinion from
coast to coast, 133 the Kelo litigation was hailed as the chance for the Supreme
Court to reverse the trend of eminent domain decisions that narrowed private
property owners rights, and reclaim private property rights that had been held
126 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 794.
127 Id. at 796.
12S See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
130 See infra Part V.A. and notes 158-60.
131 Interestingly, the majority opinion is silent on the meaning of economic development except
for the statement that, "Clearly, there is no basis for exempting economic development from our
traditionally broad understanding of public purpose." Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665-66.
132 U.S. CONST. amend IV; Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
133 Richard Epstein, Kelo: An American Original: Of Grubby Particulars and Grand Princi-
ples, 8 GREEN BAG 2d. 355 (Summer 2005) [hereinafter "Grbby Particulars"] (stating that "[t]he
American public has found few cases in the past 50 years as riveting as the ongoing saga in Kelo
v. City of New London."); see also Avi Salzman & Laura Mansnerus, For Homeowners, Frustra-
tion and Anger at Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 2005 at A20; Micheal Corkery & Ryan
Chittum, Eminent-Domain Uproar Imperils Projects, WALL ST. J., Aug 3, 2005, at BI (describing
how the vehement public response resulted in many large, possibly social worthwhile projects
being dropped for fear of adverse publicity); G.M. Filisko, Contra Kelo - Ohio High Court Re-
jects U.S. Supreme Court's Rationale on Eminent Domain, 31 A.B.A.J. E-REP. 3 (2006) (quoting
an Ohio attorney as saying, "There's been this huge political firestorm in response to the Kelo
decision, and I absolutely believe that if it weren't for the Kelo case, the Norwood case (which he
was working on) wouldn't have gotten into the Ohio Supreme Court because it wasn't particularly
unique.").
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basically non-existent by prior decisions.134 Kelo galvanized the public at large
because the Court not only failed to reverse the trend, but it further perpetuated
the elimination of private property rights through an even more expansive inter-
pretation of the Public Use Clause.' 35 Commentators have noted that Kelo was
"the final signal that... the U.S. Constitution... provides no protection for the
private property rights of Americans." 1
36
Susette Kelo, the lead plaintiff, was a homeowner in New London,
Connecticut.137 From the porch of her salmon colored Victorian home, Ms.
Kelo could see the water of the Thames River. 138 Her home was in no way
blighted or in bad condition. In fact, the exact opposite is true. 139 She had spent
her time fixing up her home to make it the waterfront property that she had al-
ways dreamed of.'4° Her efforts did not pay thanks to the City of New London
who nailed a condemnation notice to her front door on the day before Thanks-
giving. 141
Ms. Kelo's home, along with the homes of her neighboring residents,
were to be razed so the City could implement its new economic redevelopment
plan. 142 This redevelopment plan was adopted to rejuvenate the City of New
London's economy after the city had fallen into tough times. 143 This plan was
designed to encourage new economic opportunities in the area and supplement
Pfizer Corporation's construction of a $300 million dollar research facility on
the outer edge of Fort Trumbull. 144
To accomplish this goal the city formed a private redevelopment group
called the New London Development Corporation (hereinafter the "NLDC" or
"development corporation"), a private non-profit entity created by the city with
134 To liberals, Kelo represents the worst of rent-seeking politics where the powerful and
wealthy may triumph over the common man. Grubby Particulars, supra note 133 at 355. To con-
servatives, Kelo represents an unnecessary expansion of governmental power. Id.
135 See generally Grubby Particulars, supra note 133, at 355.
136 See Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Dana Berliner, Senior Attorney, Institute for
Justice).
137 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. For an in depth look at the City of New London see Steven E.
Buckingham, Comment, The Kelo Threshold: Private Property and Public Use Reconsidered, 39
U. RICH. L. REv. 1279, 1282-91 (2005).
138 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Laura Mansnerus, Ties to a Neighborhood at Root of Court Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2001, at B5.
142 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
143 Id. at 2658. After the federal government closed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in
New London in 1998, the State authorized millions of dollars to be spent in support of the new, 90
acre Fort Trumbull State Park. POWELL, supra note 2, at § 79F.03(3)(b)(iii). The city was facing a
skyrocketing unemployment rate, nearly double that of the state. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
144 Id. at 2659.
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enormous power and even larger goals. 145 Some of the land comprising the re-
development area was already in the hands of the City. But the property that
was not city owned was acquired through purchases made by the NLDC.'
46
Some landowners within this development area refused to sell.' 47 These were
private homes that were scattered across the future development plot, and it was
the owners of these homes who mounted a legal challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the eventual takings. 148 In attempting to take these homes, the NLDC did
not allege these properties were blighted or in poor condition. They sought to
condemn them only because of their location in the development area.149 The
homeowners argued that, since their homes were not located in the redevelop-
ment areas designated by the NLDC to be marinas or walkways to be used by
the public, their properties were not being taken for a public purpose. 150 There-
fore, the landowners argued, the taking of their properties was unconstitutional.
The landowner's asked the Court to lay out a "bright-line rule that economic
development does not qualify as a public use."'
151
Sarcastically pointing out the uselessness of the Public Use Clause as it
is currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, one scholar opines that "there
would be no reason to have takings protection at all if governments ... only
acted in the interest of the entire public every time they took land [a]nd ... had
superior knowledge of the anticipated consequences of their actions" therefore
eminent domain would be used to maximize social welfare every time it was
used, and this could be guaranteed. 152 The scholar further notes that "if both
motive and knowledge reside in local governments, then why slow down the
wheels of progress ... we should just let it rip: the more aggressive the use of
condemnation power, the better, for everyone wins in the long run if the wise
and just government has its way.' ' 153 This author satirically points out that the
exercise of eminent domain is not always for a noble purpose, and to put all the
power in the Legislature who get political donations from corporate America
(such as Pfizer), is not the best plan. This "fairy tale rendition of government"
145 Id. at 2658-59. The power this Note refers to is the eminent domain power delegated to the
NLDC by the city. Id at 2660. The goals included the building of marinas, walkways, a hotel and
conference center, a state park, new residences, and office and retail space. Id.
146 Id. at 2659 (noting that some of the land was already previously a naval facility). One com-
mentator notes that the economic development could have been "easily accomplished if the City
has made sensible use" of the land it already owned. See Grubby Particulars, supra note 133, at
356. The City had already spent some 73 million dollars on "strategic planning, infrastructure,
improvement, and environmental cleanup." Id.
147 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
148 Id. at 2659-60.
149 Id. at 2660.
150 Grubby Particulars, supra note 133, at 356.
151 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
152 Grubby Particulars, supra note 133, at 359.
153 Id.
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was exposed by the Kelo case, because "ambition exceeded judgment every step
of the way. ''4
A. The Majority Opinion
Following broad precedent that allows the Public Use Clause to be satis-
fied by any "public benefit," the Kelo majority permitted the condemnations to
go forward based on the "public benefits" that the city claimed the project
would have. 155
After quickly reviewing the Berman and Midkiff cases, the majority
opinion summarized the Court's current position regarding the Public Use
Clause by stating:
Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized that the
needs of society have varied between different parts of the Na-
tion, just as they have evolved over time in response to changed
circumstances. Our earliest cases in particular embodied a
strong theme of federalism, emphasizing the "great respect" that
we owe to state legislatures and state courts in discerning local
public needs. 
156
154 Id.
155 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665. The redevelopment plan was expected to "complement the facility
that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues, encourage public
access to and use of the city's waterfront, and eventually build momentum for the revitalization of
the rest of the city ...." Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 508-509 (Conn. 2004).
Further, it was expected to generate between 1700 and approximately 3200 jobs and between
$680,000 to $1.2 million dollars in property tax revenues. Id at 510.
156 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664 (citing Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606-07
(1908) (Stating that the needs of States vary because a State's "resources, the capacity of the soil,
the relative importance of industries to the general public welfare, and the long-established meth-
ods and habits of the people."); see also Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S 361, 367-68 (1905); Strickley v.
Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (stating that "In the opinion of the
legislature and the Supreme Court of Utah the public welfare of that State demands aerial lines
between the mines upon its mountain sides and railways in the valleys below should not be made
impossible by the refusal of a private owner to sell the right to cross his land. The Constitution of
the United States does not require us to say that they are wrong."); O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S.
244, 253 (1915). This case noted that:
States may take account of their special exigencies, and when the extent of
their arid or wet lands is such that a plan for irrigation or reclamation accord-
ing to districts may fairly be regarded as one which promotes the pubic inter-
est, there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which denies to them the right
to formulate this policy or to exercise the power of eminent domain in carry-
ing it into effect. With the local situation the state court is particularly familiar
and its judgment is entitled to the highest respect.
Id. (citing Union Lime Co. v. N.W. Ry. Co., 233 U.S. 211, 218 (1914); Hairston, 208 U.S. at 606-
07; Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531; Clark, 198 U.S at 367-68).
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Under the typical rational basis review, Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for
the majority regarding the public purpose of the proposed plan, stated that
"[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments. 157
With this view as the guidepost, it is hard to imagine any development
plan that would fail. Inevitably, the development corporation has the eminent
domain authority of the locality as delegated to them by the legislature, and any
development project can certainly be said to generate some benefit for the pub-
lic, no matter how minute. 158 Only an unimaginative and incompetent condemn-
ing government body could fail to come up with a justification for the project to
show benefit to the public, and satisfying the public use requirement will be
reduced to the question of whether the government has a "stupid staff" who
cannot meet this minimal standard.
15 9
In dismissing an application of the narrow view, the Kelo court stated
that this "Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned prop-
erty be put into use for the general public.'' 16 Explaining its departure from this
test, the Court stated, "Not only was the use by the public test difficult to admin-
ister, but it proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving
needs of society.'
' 61
After quickly washing away any hopes of the New London landowner's
for a rebirth of the narrow view, the majority opinion stated that "[p]romoting
economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of the gov-
ernment," and further "[tihere is .. .no principled way of distinguishing eco-
nomic development from the other purposes that we have recognized."1 62 Ac-
knowledging that public purpose is a broad interpretation of public use, the
Court noted that "there is no basis for exempting economic development from
157 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). While Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Kelo v.
New London, his comments at a Nevada Bar Association meeting seem to weaken his support for
the opinion. Just Stevens stated that the outcome was "unwise" and that he "was convinced that
the law compelled a result that I would have opposed if I were a legislator." Linda Greenhouse,
Supreme Court Memo; Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005,
at Al. Justice Stevens confessed that personally he felt that "the free play of market forces is
more likely to produce acceptable results in the long run that the best-intentioned plans of public
officials." Id.
158 This is the essence of Justice O'Connor's opinion, see infra Part B.
159 See Amicus Brief of the Institute for Justice at 50, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct.
2655 (2005) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992)).
160 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244).
161 Id. (citing Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co v. Sewell, II Nev. 394, 410 (1876)); Philip
Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. Rev 615, 619-
24 (1940) (stating that many state courts either circumvented the "use by the public" test when
necessary or abandoned it completely).
162 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
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our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose."' 163 This argument
seems empty and limitless.
While distinguishing economic development from other purposes that
have been traditionally recognized may in itself be impossible, the essence of
this argument's underpinnings are that once a phrase has been interpreted to
mean one thing, it is no big deal to take it one logical step further. Harkening
back to Justice Patterson's comments earlier in Section II of this Note, this type
of "[i]nnovation is dangerous" because one encroachment leads to another" and
"precedent gives birth to precedent" causing the "Constitution to eventually be
destroyed."' 64 These sentiments were echoed loud and clear in the scathing
opinions of the dissenting justices.
B. Dissenting Opinions and Views
Writing in opposition to the majority's expansive view of the Public
Use Clause, Justice O'Connor stated, "Under the banner of economic develop-
ment, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to
another private property owner, so long as it might be upgraded - i.e. given to
an owner who will use it in a way the legislature deems more beneficial to the
public - in the process." 165  In the dissent's view, the majority's opinion
"wash[es] out any distinction between private and public use of property - and
thereby effectively ... delete[s] the phrase 'for public use' from the TakingsClause." 66
Justice O'Connor, attempting to distinguish the New London landown-
ers' situation from that of the landowners in Berman and Midkiff, noted that
"[i]n both [of] those cases, the extraordinary, pre-condemnation use of the tar-
geted property inflicted affirmative harm on society . . . . [And] the relevant
legislative body had found that eliminating that existing property use was neces-
sary to remedy the harm., 167 Therefore, a "public purpose was realized when
the harmful use was eliminated." And since the taking itself served the public
benefit, it did not matter that the property was turned over to private parties. 16s
In Kelo, on the other hand, no public purpose is realized by the condemnation
and taking of these homes. The NLDC does not claim that the landowners'
well-maintained homes are the foundation for any social harm. They claim only
that the homes are within an area designated for redevelopment. 169 In making
163 Id.
164 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
165 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
166 Id.; see Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. John Comyn, R- Tex).
167 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 2675 (further noting that it the NLDC could not claim that these homes were the
source of some public harm without making the absurd claim that "any single-family home might
be razed to make way for an apartment building, or any church that might be replaced with a retail
2007]
25
Silkwood: The Downlow on <em>Kelo</em>: How an Expansive Interpretation of
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
this claim, the majority opinion moves away from decisions that sanction the
condemnation of harmful property use and "the Court today significantly ex-
pands the meaning of public use."'7
0
Justice O'Connor further argued that, under the Court's new expansive
interpretation of the Takings Clause, the government can "take . . . property
currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for a new, ordinary private
use" provided that "the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit
for the public - such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic
pleasure.' 7 1  Moreover, as the dissent argues, nearly any new use of private
property can easily be said to generate some secondary benefit for public.
72
"[I]f predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side-effects are enough to render
transfer from one private party to another constitutional, then the words 'for
public use' do not realistically exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any
constraint on the [exercise of] eminent domain power."'173 Take for example the
tearing down of one home and the rebuilding of an exact replica in its place,
only under new ownership. This would require labor, materials, loans, inspec-
tions, and appraisals, all of which would be bought, serviced and contracted for,
locally. And this does not even include the sales and income tax that this demo-
lition and construction would provide. All of this could be considered secon-
dary benefits to the public, or economic development, which under the major-
ity's opinion, is a valid reason for the exercise of eminent domain.
Predictable positive side effects likely could be the result of the con-
denation of any home or business and therefore "[t]he specter of condemna-
tion hangs over all [of] property., 174 "For who among us can say she already
makes the most productive or attractive possible use of her property?' ' 75 This
transparent distinction would allow a home to be replaced by a shopping mall, a
farm with a factory, or Motel 6 by a Ritz-Carlton. 17
6
store, or any small business that might be more lucrative if it were instead a part of a national
franchise, is inherently harmful to society and this within the government's power to condemn.").
170 Id. (emphasis added).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 2676.
175 Id.
176 Id. Examples supporting Justice O'Connor's statement can be seen in the following:
Bugryn v. Bristol, 774 A.2d 1042, 1045 (Conn. App. 2001)(taking the homes and farm of four
owners in their 70's and 80's and giving it to an "industrial park"); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lan-
caster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (attempted taking of a 99 Cents
store to replace with a Costco); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
455, 457 (Mich. 1981) (taking a working-class, immigrant community in Detroit and giving it to a
General Motors assembly plant), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765
(2004); Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
4-11, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (describing takings of religious proper-
ties); see also BERLINER, supra note 8 (collecting accounts of economic development takings).
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Justice Clarence Thomas, who authored his own dissenting opinion, de-
scribed the majority's replacement of the Public Use Clause with the Public
Purpose Clause or, as he also called it, the Diverse and Ever Evolving Needs of
Society Clause, by stating that "[tihis ... shift in phraseology enables the Court
today to hold, against all common sense, that a costly urban-renewal project
whose stated purpose is a vague promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue,
but which is also suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation, is for a 'pub-
lic use.""
177
To Justice Thomas, "the most natural reading of the Clause" would al-
low "the government to take property only if the government owns, or the pub-
lic has the legal right to use, the property, as opposed to taking it for any public
purpose or necessity whatsoever."' 178 This is a throwback to the narrow view of
old, or at least a view with some limits; which implicitly dissenting Justices
O'Connor, Thomas, Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist do not feel the Kelo
interpretation offers.
VI. RACE AND CLASS IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROADENING OF THE PUBLIC USE
CLAUSE
Having laid out the evolution of the Public Use Clause over time, this
Note shifts to predicting the future impacts of the increasingly broad interpreta-
tion of the Clause. The broadening of the Public Use Clause in the more than
215 years since the inception of the Constitution will have major negative im-
pacts, especially on minorities and those with less money or political clout, 179
whom it has been shown that eminent domain is already used against most. 180
In his sharply worded Kelo dissent, Justice Thomas jabbed, "[T]hough
citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are
not. '4 1 To most Americans, this statement has never rung so true. Justice Tho-
mas and Justice O'Connor realized what the fall-out of the Kelo decision would
be. They saw that the impact of the decision would be felt most severely by
poor and minority communities. 182 They knew that it is beyond doubt that if the
177 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He further stated that "[iff such 'eco-
nomic development' takings are for a 'public use' any taking is, and the Court has erased the
Public Use Clause from our Constitution..." Id.
178 Id. at 2679.
179 Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Hilary 0. Shelton, NAACP) (arguing that "even
if you dismiss all other motivations allowing municipalities to pursue eminent domain for private
development... [eminent domain] will clearly have a disparate impact on African-Americans and
other racial minorities ... in our country.").
180 Id.
181 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Sarcastically noting that under the 4h
Amendment, homeowners are safe from illegal searches within their homes. Id.
182 Id. at 2677, 2686-87. Speaking on the purposes of the public use and just compensation
components of the Fifth Amendment, Justice O'Connor stated:
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public use provision in the takings clause is relaxed, takings will occur more
frequently and gather up considerably more land. 8 3 If takings occur more fre-
quently it is unquestionable that minority communities will be targeted. In the
name of urban renewal and economic development, the relaxing and eventual
demise of the Public Use Clause will lead to the downfall of minority Ameri-
cans' private property rights.184
The consequences of this decision "promise to be harmful" since, al-
though some compensation is required to be paid, "no compensation is possible
for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indig-
nity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes.'' 85  "Allowing... govern-
ment to take property solely for public purposes," is in Justice Thomas's eyes,
"bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any
economically beneficial goal guarantees that th[o]se losses will fall dispropor-
tionately on poor communities."
'186
Susette Kelo, the lead plaintiff in Kelo v. City of New London, charac-
terized eminent domain as "the poor and middle class ha[ving] to make way for
the rich and politically connected."' 7 The truth in this statement will become
more and more evident in the post-Kelo era. Coupling the Supreme Court's
Kelo interpretation of the Public Use Clause 88 with the broad interpretation of
that clause even before Kelo,189 it is easy to see why Americans are nervous
about state and local governments increasing the use of eminent domain for
redevelopment projects. 19
Together they ensure stable property ownership by providing safeguards
against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the government's eminent
domain power - particularly against those who, for whatever reasons, may be
unable to protect themselves in the political process against the majority's
will. The pubic use requirement ... imposes a... basic limitation, circum-
scribing the very scope of eminent domain power: Government may compel
an individual to forfeit her property for the public's use, but not for the bene-
fit of another private person. This requirement promotes fairness as well se-
curity.
Id. at 2672 (internal citations omitted).
183 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that this outcome will be a "pre-
dictable result of the loosening of public use conditions").
'94 See Prichett, supra note 80, at 2. Several studies have shown how urban elites promoted
redevelopment to protect their real estate investments. Id.
185 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 2686-87.
187 Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Susette Kelo, plaintiff in Kelo v. City of New
London).
188 See discussion supra Part V.
189 See discussion supra Parts I, 111 and IV.
190 Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASHINGTON POST, October
9, 2005, at B-2; Adam H. Charnes & Laura A. Greer, Controversy Over 'Kelo,' THE NATIONAL
LAW JOURNA, Aug. 3, 2005, at 12.
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This nervousness led the Senate Judiciary Committee to hold a hearing
on the issue of private property rights in light of the Kelo decision. Testifying in
front of the House Judiciary Committee, Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex) stated,
[Jiust [to] show the range of individuals and groups concern[ed]
[about the Kelo decision], an amicus brief filed by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People [hereinaf-
ter "NAACP"] and AARP ... noted [that] [a]bsent a true pub-
lic-use requirement the Takings Clause will be employed more
frequently. The takings that result will disproportionately affect
and harm the economically disadvantaged and in particular ra-
cial and ethnic minorities and the elderly. 191
Hilary 0. Shelton, Director of NAACP's Washington Bureau echoed this out-
look while testifying in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the
Kelo decision. He stated that "[riacial and ethnic minorities are not just affected
more often by the exercise of eminent domain power, but we are almost always
affected differently and more profoundly."' 92  He noted that the dispersion
caused by the condemnation affects those groups' abilities to exercise what little
political clout they may have established. 1
93
The history of eminent domain is ripe with abuses exclusively targeting
racial and ethnic minorities and poor neighborhoods. This decision will only
exacerbate these abuses.' 94 Indeed, urban renewal, which over its sketchy past
has displaced scores of African-Americas, came to be called "Negro removal"
191 Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn, R-Tex.) (internal quotations
omitted); Id. (statement of Susette Kelo) (stating that "[a]s quickly as the NLDC acquired homes
in my neighborhood, they came in and demolished them, with no regard for the remaining resi-
dents who lived there, most of whom were elderly.").
192 Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Hilary 0. Shelton).
193 Id.
194 Id.; Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE
B. SAGALYN, DowNTowN, INC.: How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIrS 28-29 (1989). This book quoted
the former Attorney General of Minnesota, who was recounting a Minneapolis highway project
from the 1950's, as saying:
We went through the black section between Minneapolis and St. Paul about
four blocks wide and we took out the home of every black man in that city.
And woman and child. In both those cities, practically. It ain't there any-
more, is it? Nice neat black neighborhood, you know, with their churches and
all and we gave them about $6,000 a house and turned them loose on society.
id.; See also ADAM COHEN AND EuZABETH TAYLOR, AMERICAN PHAROAH 216-22 (2000) (illus-
trating how Chicago's use of urban renewal in the 1950's and 60's was "expressly designed to
keep the central [Chicago] area white and to physically cut it off from black Chicago" and how
this "must now be seen as an important step" in the "process of making Chicago America's most
racially segregated large city.").
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instead of urban renewal. 95 Further, scholars have noted how governments
have "implemented policies to segregate and maintain the isolation of the poor,
minority, and otherwise outcast populations," a problem that will only be exac-
erbated by the Kelo majority opinion's interpretation of the public use clause. 196
Recognizing that a future of eminent domain abuse is likely after the
Kelo decision, Mr. Shelton stated, "The expansion of eminent domain to allow
government[s] or its designees to take property simply by asserting that it can
put the property to a higher use will systematically sanction transfers from those
with less resources to those with more.' 197 For example he noted that ninety
percent of the over 10,000 families displaced by blight focused eminent domain
projects in the greater Baltimore area were African American.198 Further, in Los
Angeles, a Mexican neighborhood was completely demolished so the city could
continue to expand its freeways. 199 Over 97 percent of the people forcibly re-
moved from their homes by the "slum clearance" project in Berman, were Afri-
can-American.2 ° One commentator estimates that no less than 1,600 African
American neighborhoods have been destroyed by similar government pro-
195 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2687, (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Wendell E. Pritchett, The Public
Menace of Blight: Urban Renewal and Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 1, 6 (2003) (noting that "blight was a facially neutral term infused with racial and ethnic
prejudice"); see also 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 194, 98.02(e) (David A. Thomas ed.,
1994) (quoting James Baldwin); see also Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Hilary 0.
Shelton).
196 See Pritchett, supra note 80, at 16-20.
197 Senate Hearing, supra note 1. This is not only a circumstance of the past. See, e.g., Charles
Toutant, Alleging Race-Based Condemnation, N.J. L.J. (Aug 2, 2004) (outlining litigation alleging
that municipalities targeted minority areas in an attempt to force them from the community in
favor of those people and businesses that the local government considers more desirable.); Erik
Schwartz, Progress or Discrimination? Facing Displacement, Minorities Battle Towns' Eminent
Domain, Courier-Post, July 30, 2004.
198 Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Hilary 0. Shelton); FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra
note 194, at 29.
199 Id.
200 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954); Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas further noted that:
Of all the families displaced by urban renewal from 1949 through 1963, 63
percent of those whose race as known were nonwhite, and of these families,
56 percent of nonwhites and 38 percent of whites had income low enough to
qualify for public housing, which, however, was seldom available to them.
Public works projects in the 1950's and 1960's destroyed predominately mi-
nority communities in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Baltimore, Maryland. In 1981,
urban planners in Detroit, Michigan, uprooted the largely lower-income and
elderly Poletown neighborhood for the benefit of General Motors Corporation.
Urban renewal projects have long been associated with the displacement of
blacks; in cities across the country, urban renewal became known as Negro
removal.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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jects. 201 This is essentially the only likely result when , as one commentator
noted, "Lower class neighborhoods [are] viewed as cancerous tumors that
needed to be removed by the governmental equivalent of surgery," also know as
eminent domain. 202
For instance on May 9, 2005, in the city of Lawnside, New Jersey, the
City's planning board recommended a plan to the city council that would rede-
velop 120 acres on the northeast side of the city. 20 3 Lawnside has been a distinct
and settled African-American community since the late 1700's, and was a stop
on the historic Underground Railroad. 2°4
Further, several African-American families in Canton, Mississippi had
their homes slated for demolition to clear land for a Nissan automobile plant.2 °5
The taking of these homes, which the families had lived in for over sixty years,
was not justified on the basis of blight or necessity, but the trial court neverthe-
less ruled to allow the takings to proceed. 2°6 Upon a motion made by the fami-
lies, the Mississippi Supreme Court stayed the condemnations while it consid-
ered the families' appeal. Once the stay was granted, the State gave up its fight
against the families and dismissed its eminent domain actions.
The executive director of the Mississippi Development Authority ex-
plained, in an attempt to justify the takings, "It's not that Nissan is going to
leave if we don't get the land.2 °7 What's important is the message it would send
to other companies if we are unable to do what we said we would do.20 8 If you
make a promise to a company like Nissan, you have to be able to follow
through." 209 Clearly, the corporate dollars meant more to the Mississippi De-
velopment Authority than the Constitutional rights of the minority homeowners
whom they sought to uproot and displace. This sort of attempted justification
for the use of eminent domain is why Justice O'Connor stated in her Kelo dis-
201 MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, RooT SHOCK: How TEARING Up CITY NEIGHBORHOODS
HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 20 (2004).
202 Eric R. Claeys, Don't Waste a Teaching Moment: Kelo, Urban Renewal, and Blight, 15 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMM. DEV. L. 14 (Fall 2005). The author continues to note that, "In
Berman the US. Supreme Court described the neighborhoods at issue "as though possessed of a
congenital disease." Id. (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 34.).
203 Jason Laughlin, In Lawnside Some Fear Development, COURIER-POST, August 29, 2005, at
1G. Most of the area sought to be taken through eminent domain is vacant, but the most prized
locations, near the interstates, are residential home sites. Id.
204 Id.
205 David Firestone, Black Families Resist Mississippi Land Push, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001,
at A20.
206 Miss. Major Impact Auth. v. Archie, No. Co-2001-0082, slip op. (Miss. Spec. Ct. Madison
Cty. July 26, 2001). Interestingly, the condemning authority recognized that these parcels were
not necessary for the project, but they went ahead anyway due to the message it would send if
they could not do what they had promised. Firestone, supra note 205.
207 Firestone, supra note 205.
208 Id.
29 Id.
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sent that "[a]n external judicial check on how the public use requirement is in-
terpreted, however limited, is necessary if this constraint on government power
is to retain any meaning., 210 Without this judicial check, Justice O'Connor feels
that
Any private property may... be taken for the benefit of another
party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random...
the government now has license to transfer property from those
with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot
have intended this perverse result. "[T]hat alone is a just gov-
ernment," wrote James Madison, "which impartially secures to
every man, whatever is his own.
21
Curtailing the fallout as described by Justice O'Connor creates a "justi-
fication for intrusive judicial review of constitutional provisions that protect
discrete and insular minorities" as well as "the powerless groups and individuals
the Public Use Clause protects. 212 By upholding the deference to the legisla-
ture approach, and fundamentally removing the judiciary from Public Use de-
terminations, the Kelo majority is encouraging "those citizens with dispropor-
tionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations
and development firms, to victimize the weak., 213 It is rarely the drafters of the
development plan whose home will be condemned. 214
VII. CONCLUSION
The admitted "narrow role"215 that the courts play in eminent domain
cases is perilous and dangerous to the rights of private property owners because
it allows powerful corporations and businesses to collude with the government
216
and condemn private property for nearly any justifiable reason. Almost any
justification for the use of eminent domain can be said to fall within the wide
scope of public use because it is easy to show a possible public benefit through
210 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S.
439, 446 (1930) ("It is well established that ... the question [of] what is a public use is a judicial
one.")).
211 Id. at 2677 (citing National Gazette, Property, (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted in 14 Papers of
James Madison 266 (R Rutland et. al. eds. 1983).
212 Id. at 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213 Id. "An expansive power of eminent domain is particularly hard to insulate from abuse by
the politically and economically powerful at the expense of the disenfranchised, whose property
rights are often all they have to repel developers seeking quick profits." Eric Rutkow, Case Com-
ment, Kelo v. City of New London, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 261,269 (2006).
214 Rutkow, 30 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. at 269.
215 Berman, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
216 Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REv. 49, 51 (1999).
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general welfare, and the legislature has the express power to provide for the
general welfare.217
Thus, the judiciary is sanctioning the expansion of the Public Use
Clause and the loss of private property rights by deferring to the legislature re-
garding when the use of eminent domain is proper. This expansive interpreta-
tion of the Public Use Clause coupled with the judiciary's decision to take a
back seat to legislative determinations has opened the door for abuses of emi-
nent domain power and may have essentially eliminated the safeguards afforded
to private property under the Fifth Amendment.1 8
Eric L Silkwood*
217 U.S. CONST. art. L § 8.
218 See STEVEN GREENHUT, ABUSE OF POWER: How THE GOVERNMENT MISUSES EMINENT
DOMAIN 239-48 (2004) (illustrating how the media got involved, publicized and took a stand
against eminent domain abuse); Dean Starkman, Cities Use Eminent Domain to Clear Lots for
Big-Box Stores, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2004, at B 1 (explaining that many cities are using eminent
domain power to obtain land to give to big-box retailers such as Home Depot, Kmart, and Wal-
Mart); Dean Starkman, Take and Give: Condemnation Is Used to Hand One Business Property of
Another, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Al (noting that many state and local governments condemn
business property just to give it to another business); BERLINER, supra note 8, at 1-2 (compiling
and documenting over 10,000 "filed or threatened" condemnations of private property from Janu-
ary 1, 1998, through December 31, 2002); Jones, supra note 107, at 292. But see G.M. Filisko,
Contra Kelo - Ohio High Court Rejects U.S. Supreme Court's Rationale on Eminent Domain, 31
A.B.A.J. E-REP. (2006) (explaining how Ohio's Supreme Court rejected the holding of the Kelo
case and allowed a non-blighted home to remain standing by expressly rejecting "economic bene-
fit" as a valid justification for the use of eminent domain).
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